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Abstract
Europes Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was characterized by large in-
ternational imbalances and uneven national labor market reforms. In this papers
model, labor policies that aim to increase the welfare of capital-poor individu-
als within each country are inuenced by nancial integration across di¤erently
capital-abundant countries. The model predicts that capital outows should be
associated with labor market deregulation, as was the case in EMU, and helps
interpret inequality developments and policy tensions in that experience.
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1 Introduction
Labor market policies, rooted in country-specic historical factors and political compromises,
continue to be determined at the National level within the European Unions increasingly
integrated economic system. The resulting policy competition (Sinn, 2003) and "race-to-the-
bottom" deregulation may be disturbing for those who value social policys objectives, or
welcome for those who resent Leviathan governments and think existing policies are waste-
ful and misguided. In any case, this theoretically obvious mechanism is empirically visible
in Europes Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), where the tighter economic integration
implied by adoption of a single currency was empirically associated with labor market dereg-
ulation as well as with lower social policy expenditure and growing inequality of disposable
incomes (Bertola 2010a,b).
It is more interesting to note that the intensity of labor market reforms was di¤erent across
EMU member countries, and related to international capital ows. In the early 2000s not only
did Germany stand out as much by its large current account surpluses as by its labor market
reforms (Rinne and Zimmermann, 2012), but capital outows and labor market reforms were
more generally related across EMU member countries. Figure 1 plots current accounts and
the European Commissions Directorate General for Economic and Financial A¤airs and
Economic Policy Committee LABREF database of country-specic reforms, summarized as
in Turrini et al. (2015) by the cumulative country-specic count of measures deemed to be
increasing labor market exibility, net of those deemed to decrease it.1 These data show
that labor market deregulation and current account decits were positively and signicantly
related across countries between 1998 (the rst year available in the LABREF database and
the last before EMU) and 2005, 2006, or 2007 (the choice between these three dates matters
little because most of the divergence from zero of the two indicators had occurred by 2005, but
a positive time-series association is still visible over the 2005-2007 period in Greece, Spain,
1The summary indicator includes reforms of "Job Protection (EPL)", "Labour Taxation", "Unemployment
benets", "Wage Setting", "Working Time", "Other welfare-related benets".
The database, available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/labref/index_en.htm,
also covers reforms of "Active labour market policies", "Early Withdrawal", "Immigration/Mobility", and
"Pensions".
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and Ireland).
Figure 1
One might want to interpret the evidence as a causal relationship running from exogenous
reforms to current account imbalances. For some reason, certain countries chose to increase
the rigidity of their labor markets, lost competitiveness, and spent in excess of their income.
A feeling that such behavior was misguided might be strengthened in some eyes by the fact
that it was severely punished by a crisis which spared the more virtuous countries, in the top-
right quadrant of Figure 1, that deregulated their labor markets, restrained their expenditure,
and also happened to record the best European performances in the 2014 World Cup.
This paper adopts a less moralistic perspective on labor policies in the aftermath of nan-
cial integration. Because higher capital intensity benets individuals whose income dispro-
portionately accrues from labor, policy boosts wages and reduces employment in economies
where politically decisive individuals are capital-poorer than the average individual. If it
becomes possible for capital to ow across the borders of the countries choosing such policies,
the politico-economic equilibrium swings towards deregulation more strongly in relatively
capital-abundant ones, where politically decisive individuals become less capital-poor in the
integrated market than they were in autarky. To the extent that realized capital ows reveal
the relative capital intensity of countries, the model can explain the pattern seen in Figure
1.
This reasoning builds on insights from models of economic integrations distributional
implications for countries with di¤erent factor endowments (Mayer, 1984) and from the in-
ternational tax competition literature (reviewed by Keen and Konrad, 2013). Its focus on the
labor policy implications of nancial integration, and its ability to explain the covariation of
reforms and international nancial ows, are novel but related to previous theoretical and
empirical studies of interactions between economic integration and labor markets. Because
more intense product market competition increases the elasticity of labor demand, even in
the absence of capital or labor mobility economic integration reduces the appeal of policies
that reduce production e¢ ciency in order to insure or redistribute incomes (e.g. Bertola and
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Boeri, 2002). This e¤ect is plausibly stronger when adoption of a single currency improves
price transparency and removes devaluation risk. While country-specic information might
bring this partial-equilibrium insight to bear on heterogeneous reform patterns within EMU,
it appears di¢ cult to establish empirical proxies for the strength of international product-
market linkages. A di¤erent strand of literature uses models of aggregate demand and supply
uctuations to focus on interactions between monetary unication and labor market insti-
tutions that shape and coordinate employment and wage responses to shocks and monetary
policy (Sibert and Sutherland, 2000; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2001; Calmfors, 2001a,b).
From this perspective EMU membership might reduce deregulation incentives, by delivering
low ination even to countries where highly regulated and poorly coordinated labor markets
would bias ination upwards (Calmfors, 2001a). This theoretical possibility is not empirically
conrmed by evidence of average deregulation in EMU (Bertola 2010b) and of monetary pol-
icy credibilitys association with structural deregulation in broader advanced country samples
(Belke, Herz, and Vogel, 2007). Predictions that EMU would foster wage restraint in tra-
ditionally low-credibility countries such as Italy and perhaps Finland (Calmfors, 2001b) are
also hard to validate with the short time series data available to assess such patterns across
EMU countries.
The paper derives its simple points in Sections 2 and 3, introducing and interpreting
labor market policy in an economy where individuals di¤er in terms of whether their income
is earned by labor or from capital, and characterizing the impact in this context of capital
mobility across the boundaries of labor policy enforcement areas. Section 4 o¤ers additional
evidence, assessing the extent to which the relationship between labor market reforms and
international imbalances is specic to early EMU experience, measuring reforms in terms
of quantitative policy indicators as well as of the LABREF count indicator, and checking
whether uneven reform patterns might alternatively be explained by convergence from ini-
tially di¤erent congurations to the deregulated "bottom" or to some uniform level and style
of regulation. Section 5 studies the models welfare implications and notes that under plausi-
ble conditions capital mobility should in theory, and did in EMU, increase income inequality
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within capital-abundant countries. Section 6 concludes discussing the implications for current
policy debates of the pre-crisis empirical evidence analyzed in this paper and of the proposed
theoretical interpretation.
2 Labor policy
Consider an economy where two factors, capital and labor, enter a constant returns production
function with total productivity a and (for simplicity) constant elasticity: nl units of labor
and k units of capital produce k(anl)1  = () anl units of output, where   k=(anl)
denotes the economys capital intensity. Output is paid to factor units according to their
marginal productivity,
w = a (1  ) () ; r =  () 1 ; (1)
which is increasing in capital intensity for labor, and decreasing for capital.
The economy is populated by individuals indexed by i who own heterogeneous amounts ki
and ni of the two factors. Crucially, labor supply is endogenous, in that individuals choose the
proportion li of their ni that is employed in market production. Using a constant elasticity
function to represent its income-equivalent welfare cost, individual is total welfare has the
quasilinear form2
ui = rki + wnili   b(li)
1+
1 + 
ni: (2)
It will be of interest to characterize the individual welfare implications of policies that, as
discussed in the next subsection, insert a proportional wedge ! 6= 1 between the marginal
product of labor, w in (1), and the income-equivalent marginal utility of non-market activities,
b (li)
 . When (2) is maximized with respect to l, the rst-order condition b (li)
 = !w and
(1) imply l =
 
! ab (1  ) ()
1= . Inserting this expression in (2) makes it possible to
express individual welfare as a function of !, aggregate capital intensity, and individual
2 In this simple expression a larger ni increases both market and non-market labor, as may be appropriate
if, for example, better education or health not only improve market productivity but also makes leisure more
enjoyable. The model would be only slightly more complicated if b were allowed to vary across individuals.
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factor endowments:
u(!; ; ki; ni) =  ()
 1 ki + (1  )
1+
 ()
 1+
 !
1


1 +    !
1 + 

(a=b)1= ani: (3)
Because higher capital intensity reduces the unit income of capital and increases the welfare
surplus a¤orded by optimal allocation to market use of labor units, the two additive terms of
(3), weighted by the individuals factor endowments, move in opposite directions as  varies
at given !. In turn, the equilibrium   k=(anl) depends on !: using l = (!w=b)1= and w
from (1),  = k=

an
 
! ab (1  ) ()
1= can be solved for
(!) = (1  )  1+
 
k
(a!=b)1= an
! 
+
: (4)
Di¤erentiating u(!; (!); ki; ni) with respect to !, the rst-order condition for maximiza-
tion of (3) can be rearranged to
(1  )  1 () + ki
(a!=b)1= ani
! =


(1 +    !) ! + 1

(1  !) ; (5)
where !  ! @@! =  1= (+ ). Inserting (4) in (5), the welfare-maximizing policy para-
meter is
! = 1 + 

ki=ni
k=n
  1

(6)
for an individual who earns income from ki and ni in an economy where the aggregate amount
of these factors are k and n.
2.1 Interpretation and implementation
The simple expression (6) shows that ! = 1 maximizes the welfare of an individual who owns
the two factors in the same proportions as the aggregate economy. Intuitively, e¢ cient laissez
faire is what should be observed if the economy admitted a representative individual, either
because all individuals are indeed identical, or because public schemes or private contracts
make it possible to transfer utility across individuals.
To see why non-representative individuals prefer ! 6= 1, consider the equilibrium implica-
tions of preventing equality between labors marginal market productivity and contribution to
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individual welfare. Figure 2 illustrates a situation where ! < 1 increases the market income
w of labor and decreases its market employment l. Parameters a, b, k, and n, which deter-
mine the scale of aggregate and individual production and employment, are all normalized to
unity. Elasticities are set to  = 0:35 (for roughly realistic factor shares of aggregate income)
and  = 2 (this parameter determines the slope of labor supply and distributes policy e¤ects
across employment and wage levels, but the models other implications are the same as long
as it is positive and nite).3 In the ! = 1 laissez faire case these parameters would imply
that l = 0:84. This is the horizontal position of the crossing point of lines tracing tracing
employments marginal implications for a labor units market production (k)(al)1  and
welfare loss b (l)1+ =(1 + ) in Figure 2, where ! = 0:825 lowers l by 0:175=(+ ) = 0:074,
or about 9%, below it laissez faire level.
Figure 2
When b (l) = !w, the area (around point A in Figure 2) between the downward sloping
line and the horizontal line at level w corresponds to the market production of a unit of labor,
net of its cost wl: this, scaled by n=k, is paid out to capital in equilibrium. The area (around
point C) between the upward sloping line and the horizontal line at level !w corresponds to
a labor units income wl, net of the b (l)1+ =(1 + ) term that represents in a simple and
very tractable way the contribution to individual welfare of home production or leisure and,
in equilibrium, varies with l and ! as long as  <1.
Besides areas A and C, employment l of a unit of labor also yields the welfare correspond-
ing the rectangular area around point B. This can be shifted toward labor by policies that
have the e¤ects of ! 6= 1 in the model.4 For example, a proportional payroll tax  implies
! = 1    : if its revenue (the rectangular area C in Figure 2) is rebated to individuals in
proportion to their ni, individual welfare amounts to (3). If labors marginal productivity
3Constant-elasticity functional forms imply that factor shares of market income are independent of !. In
the model, capital and labor di¤er only in terms of international mobility; it would be possible to derive similar
theoretical implications allowing for other immobile-factor income, such as that paid to land, and for some
internationally mobile labor.
4 In micro-founded macroeconomic models, policies and deviations from perfect competition can generally
be represented by wedges between demand and supply (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2007).
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cannot decline below w, then in Figure 2 labors unit welfare includes the area around point C
as well as the rectangle around B, and the e¤ects of legal or collectively bargained minimum
wages are also represented by ! < 1: it would be individually optimal to supply more labor,
but (3) correctly measures individual welfare if involuntary unemployment is evenly spread
across all labor units (e.g. because of a minimum wage rate per hour worked), or smoothed
across workers by employment lotteries (Andolfatto, 1996, and Merz, 1995), or distributed
over the life-cycle of each individual worker. In the model, and in Figure 2, ! < 1 can also
represent such quantity constraints as limits on weekly work hours, minimum annual holi-
days, or age-related employability rules: in this interpretation, the vertical dashed line in the
gure identies on the horizontal axis a policy-determined market employment level l that is
only a proportion !1= of what it would be in laissez faire.
The implications of these policies in isolation, or combined to let wage minima interact
with unemployment insurance (UI) benets funded by payroll taxes, are qualitatively similar
to those of ! < 1 in the model. In Figure 2, the total welfare A+B+C generated by a
unit of labor would obviously be maximized if ! = 1 eliminated the rectangle B and the
adjoining deadweight triangle. Starting from that laissez faire point, however, even as a
smaller l entails a second-order reduction of total surplus an individual who owns relatively
little capital benets to rst order by a larger area B, because if ni=n > ki=k then area A
(which amounts to 1=nth of the economys total capital income rk) matters less than the
labor-surplus areas B and C in the welfare expression (2). For this reason, that capital-poor
individual prefers some ! < 1 which, under the models constant-elasticity assumptions, is
readily computed to be (6).
2.2 Policy determination
Just as in partial equilibrium a monopoly union restricts employment in order to capture a
larger portion of a smaller producer surplus, so policy in the models simple general equilib-
rium may decrease total income and welfare in order to redistribute it across heterogeneous
individuals.
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Observed policies are those preferred by the politically decisive subset of the population.
Recalling expression (6) for each individuals preferred !, political aspects can be summarized
by
x 
~ki=~ni
k=n
(7)
for ~ki=~ni is the capital/labor ratio of the decisive individual in an economy where that ratio
is k=n. In politico-economic equilibrium, policy maximizes that individuals welfare: using
(6),
!(x) = 1 +  (x  1) (8)
implies that the ratio of labors marginal contributions to welfare in market and non-market
uses deviates from unity by the product of , the elasticity to capital of market production,
and the deviation from unity of x, the decisive individuals capital/labor ratio as a fraction
of the economys. In Figure 2, x = 0:5, and ! = 0:825 maximizes the welfare of an individual
who is only half as well endowed with capital as the aggregate economy.
Should the decisive individuals relative capital ratio exceed unity, then x > 1 would
imply that wages are subsidized and leisure is taxed, or that maximum wages and minimum
working times are imposed, to move the economys equilibrium beyond the crossing point
in Figure 2. Such policies seem unusual even for the most business-friendly countries. In
reality, labor income is taxed and non-employment is subsidized, collective contracts or laws
impose minimum wages, and laws set upper bounds on working time. In other models, these
as well as more "active" policies might be justied by market failures. In the stylized model
of this section, they benet the individuals who have the power to implement and enforce
them: policy distorts employment below its laissez faire level for the purpose of maximizing
the welfare of an individual whose capital/labor ratio is smaller than the aggregate one. This
simple interpretation is theoretically sound as long as utility can only be transferred across
individuals via distorted market interactions and, as will be clear in what follows, ts the
empirical evidence well.
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3 Capital mobility
Representing the implications of diverse labor policies with a single labor wedge ! makes
it easy to characterize how their politico-economic determination reacts to integration of
economies that, like individuals, feature di¤erent capital/labor ratios. Labor policy tends to
reduce employment if policy is chosen by democratic majority and the median capital/labor
ratio is realistically lower than the average. Political power may be unevenly distributed
along the relevant dimension of heterogeneity, for example because of wealthier individuals
control of the media. However, any political mechanism that maps heterogeneous economic
interests into a choice of ! can be represented in what follows by an x factor ratio that
remains unchanged when a country integrates economically with others, while retaining its
power to set and enforce labor policies.
To model economic integration, let capital become mobile beyond the borders of the
single-good economy outlined in Section 2.5 It is simplest to let the country introduced
above integrate with just one other country, where capital and labor amount to K and N
rather than k and n, and the labor policy wedge is also denoted by an upper case 
 rather
than by !. Within the integrated economy, countries are entities that set and enforce policy,
so their boundaries need not be related to tastes and technology. This makes it sensible
to assume constant returns to scale in production and let the elasticity parameters  and
 be the same throughout the integrated economy. It can however be useful to let the
productivity of market and non-market activities be di¤erent across countries: a 6= A and
b 6= B may represent the productivity implications of policies other than those represented by
! and 
, or heterogeneous cultural or geographical features of areas where di¤erent policies
are enforced.
5 In more detailed models international capital mobility could be redundant because its allocation across
sectors with di¤erent factor intensities ensures factor-price equalization as in Mayer (1984). It would also
be possible to study model economies where di¤erently skilled labor types are more intensively employed in
tradable sectors of the integrating economies and/or nd it easier to migrate. These adjustment mechanisms
may not be as immediate as changes of investment volumes, however, and are not relevant to the early EMU
international nancial imbalances that motivate this paper.
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Under perfect capital mobility, capital intensity is equalized at
 =
kd
anl
=
Kd
ANL
=
k +K
anl +ANL
;
where kd and Kd = (K + k)   kd denote the capital amounts used in the two countries
domestic production. Using l =
 
! ab (1  ) ()
1= and L =  
AB (1  ) ()1= ,
 =
k +K
an
 
! ab
1=
+AN
 

AB
1=
(1  )1= ()
can be solved for
(!) = (1  )  1;+
 
k +K
(a!=b)1= an+ (A
=B)1= AN
! 
+
: (9)
This equilibrium capital intensity expression is well-dened if  > 0 makes it possible to
obtain an interior equilibrium allocation of capital. Like its (4) closed-economy counterpart
(which is well dened in the  = 0 case of constant returns to k and n), it depends on !, but
capital mobility implies that the other countrys factor endowments and policy wedge also
matter, and reduces the elasticity of (!) to an extent that depends on the countrys relative
size:
! =  (!;
)
+ 
, for (!;
) =
an (!a=b)1=
(a!=b)1= an+ (A
=B)1= AN
: (10)
Inserting (10) and (9) in (5), the rst-order condition for maximization with respect to ! of
the lower-case countrys decisive individuals welfare, at given 
, can be rearranged to
!(x) = 1 + 

(!;
)
(1  (!;
))+ 

k
K + k
1
(!;
)
x  1

; (11)
where x as in (7) denotes the ratio of the decisive individuals to the country-average factor
income sources and, unless migration or electoral reforms modify the countrys policy-making
framework, is not a¤ected by integration.6
6These derivations and expressions are similar to their closed-economy counterparts, but not as easily
illustrated: in a picture like Figure 2s, the downward-sloping demand relationship depends on capital intensity
which in turn depends on equilibrium employment l and, through it, on both countriesparameters and policies.
This is also the reason why the labor supply slope parameter  is policy-irrelevant in the closed-economy version
of the model, but does appear in (11).
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3.1 Symmetry and size
In the integrated economys equilibrium, the policy parameters ! and 
 should simultaneously
satisfy (11) and the similar condition

(X) = 1 + 

(1  ())
()+ 

K
K + k
1
1  ()X   1

(12)
for the policy-making entity denoted by upper-case variables.
A closed-form solution is available in the special case where countries are fully symmetric.
If K = k, A = a, N = n, B = b, and X = x, then  = 1=2 = k=(k + K), and the policy
indicators
! = 1 +

+ 2
 (x  1) = 
; (13)
where = (+ 2) < 1, are closer to unity than (8). Uncoordinated policy choices gravitate
towards the laissez faire ! = 
 = 1 conguration because capital mobility dilutes the incen-
tives for non-representative individuals to distort employment. Formally, the welfare e¤ects
of employment distortions work through changes of capital intensity with an elasticity that is
only half as large as in autarky for two symmetric integrated countries. Intuitively, a capital-
poor decisive individual still prefers to reduce employment, but to a lesser extent when the
resulting higher capital intensity and lower capital unit income induces capital outows.
Consider next the implications of country size. In models of tax competition, the burden
of nancing public spending falls on immobile factors (Keen and Konrad, 2013), and relatively
small constituencies within an integrated economic area impose lower tax rates because their
tax base is more elastic than that of larger ones. Here, country size is measured in terms of
the share  of the integrated economys employment. This, as dened in (10), depends not
only on population n and productivity a, but also on the policy parameter !. To satisfy (11),
! becomes its autarky counterpart (8) as  and k= (K + k) tend to unity, and tends towards
its unitary laissez faire value as  and k= (K + k) tend to zero: for a small open economy
that integrates in big world, capital intensity is independent of !, and employment distortions
that leave unit factor incomes unchanged are completely pointless. Between these extreme
cases, the smaller country enforces less restrictive policies: di¤erentiating the right-hand side
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of (11) with respect to  yields
d
d

1 +

(1  ) + 

k
K + k
1

x  1

=   
(+    )2



1  k
K + k
x

+ 

;
(14)
which is certainly negative if x < 1 implies that labor policy realistically favors relatively
capital-poor individuals. Hence, a policy that is enforced over a smaller portion of the
integrated economic area implies a smaller deviation of ! below unity. Country size is in turn
a function (!;
) of endogenous policy choices, and combining (14) with
d(!;
)
d

=   1


(!;
) (1  (!;
)) < 0
implies an intuitive "race-to-the-bottom" mechanism: deregulation elsewhere decreases the
countrys e¤ective relative size, and makes deregulation more attractive.
3.2 Capital asymmetries and ows
The policy determination condition (11) di¤ers from its autarky counterpart (8) not only
because (!;
) ((1  (!;
)) + ) 1 6= 1, representing familiar policy spillovers, but also
because (!;
) 6= k= (K + k), i.e., each countrys share of immobile e¤ective labor di¤ers
from its share of mobile capital in the integrated economy. While integration of completely
symmetric countries just shifts policy from (8) to (13), integration of countries with di¤erent
capital intensity also triggers capital mobility, and the models politico-economic mechanism
implies di¤erent policy choices when integration makes the countrys decisive individual more
or less capital poor than in autarky. If the (unchanged) decisive individual is less capital-
poor in the integrated economy than in his own country, integration implies labor market
deregulation. This is what happens if the country as a whole is relatively capital-abundant,
and experiences capital outows upon integration. In a country that is capital-poor relative
to the integrated area and experiences capital inows, conversely, the model predicts that
labor policy should become relatively more restrictive.
Nonlinearity of the () function prevents closed-form solution, but these intuitive results
can be illustrated numerically. Consider the implications of integration between the country
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considered in Figure 2 and one of two possible partner countries. In Figure 3, both candidates
for integration with Figure 2s "peripheral" country are "core" countries with higher capital
endowment (K = 3k) and total productivity (A = 1:1a, which prevents full convergence of
labor unit incomes). In the top row of panels in Figure 3, N = n. In the bottom row,
N = 0:25n implies that the core country is even more capital-intensive in autarky, and that
its size is much smaller.
The parameter sets considered in the two rows of Figure are meant to illustrate some
general properties of the model. In each row, three diagrams trace the implications of inte-
gration for labor policies, for capital intensity, and for market employment. The derivations
above characterize policy before and after a stylized nancial integration moment. To help
interpret the mechanisms at work in the model, however, each panel of the gure plots three
values of the variables on the vertical axis, moving horizontally from autarchy, to integration
without reoptimizing ! and 
, and nally to the integration with reoptimization ("reform")
equilibrium of the models integrated economy with national labor policies.7
Figure 3
The left-hand panels of Figure 3 show how the intensity of deregulation depends on relative
size and capital abundance. Both of the core country examples are more capital intensive and
deregulate less than the peripheral country. In the second row, where the peripheral country
is relatively large and very capital-poor, its ! parameter actually declines upon integration,
showing that the model can t Figure 1s evidence of increasing regulation in some EMU
countries.
In the other panels of Figure 3, capital ows and changes of employment l equalize
the countriespost-integration capital intensity. At unchanged policies, integration-induced
capital ows move the wage and l along labor supply relationships, upwards in the periphery
and downwards in the core. The rightmost segment in each panel shows the implications of
reforms. These are much more modest for capital intensity than those of integration: in the
7While a situation where capital is already mobile but policies have not yet been reformed resembles
Germanys after EMU and before the reforms, characterization of dynamic policy transitions is beyond the
scope of this paper, and beyond reach of available data.
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examples shown, capital intensity di¤ers by factors of 3 or even 10 in autarky, but reforms
change ! by single-digit percentages; in general, reform asymmetries depend to heterogeneous
capital intensity, so the second-round capital intensity implications of reforms are an order
of magnitude smaller than the direct implications of intensity-equalizing capital ows.
The countries reforms and their employment implications, however, are interestingly
di¤erent both in general and in the specic examples shown in Figure 3. In the core country,
deregulation fully or partially o¤sets the l e¤ect of capital ows. In the top row, the periphery
also deregulates and increases employment, so reforms induce a decline of capital intensity
in the integrated area. In the bottom row, the relatively large periphery countrys decisive
agent nds it optimal to move ! further away from unity, tightening regulation and reducing
employment: for the parameters used in plotting the gure, this happens to fully o¤set
deregulation in the core, and reforms leave unchanged the integrated areas capital intensity.
3.3 Many countries
The mechanisms illustrated by the two-country example can be readily extended to a larger
number of countries. When N countries indexed by c join a common capital market, in each
the policy wedge moves from an expression in the form (8) to the solution of a system of N
equations in the form (11), with
 = (1  )  1+
 PN
c=1 kcPN
c=1 (ac!c=bc)
1
 acnc
! 
+
:
Figure 4 illustrates numerically the cross-sectional implications of integration across coun-
tries featuring all 27 combinations of a low, a mid-range, and a high value of capital kc,
population nc, and e¢ ciency ac. Other parameters, and in particular the relative capital
abundance x of decisive individuals, are the same in all countries as in the previous gures.
Hence, !c = 0:825 for all countries in autarky. Because for large N uncoordinated policies
are enforced in small portions of the integrated areas e¤ective labor, the model predicts
that perfect nancial integration should everywhere result in almost complete deregulation.
Showing how the reforms that bring countries nearly to the deregulated "bottom" are related
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to country-specic parameters and to capital reallocation, however, uncovers patterns that
are qualitatively similar to those implied in more complicated models, and in reality, by the
less intense policy competition at work when frictions prevent complete return equalization
across (and within) countries.
Figure 4
Three panels of Figure 4 illustrate some ceteris paribus predictions of the model: deregu-
lation pressure is weaker in countries that are larger in terms of the size n and/or e¢ ciency
a of their immobile factor endowment, or less capital abundant. The position and slope of
the relationship between each of these country features and reforms depends on parameters
other than the one on each panels horizontal axis. At given k, for example, larger n or a
imply lower deregulation pressure, and smaller intensity-equalizing capital ows. But while
country heterogeneity has too many dimensions, even in this simple model, to be reliably
detected on the basis of available macroeconomic data, it is interesting and intuitive to see
in the bottom-right panel that it is largely smoothed out when the theoretical implications
of integration for deregulation and for capital ows are plotted against each other. Almost
regardless of the reason why capital intensity di¤ers in autarky, the impacts of integration
on capital ows and on reforms are positively related across countries. The resulting asso-
ciation between capital ows and changes of the !c labor wedge is similar to the empirical
correlation between current accounts and the LABREF count of policy measures shown for
EMU in Figure 1.
4 EMU, not EMU, and policy indicators
The models perspective and insights can be relevant in regions and periods other than the
early EMU experience that motivates this papers theoretical exercise. The prediction that
at given capital intensities smaller integrated policy-making entities should have stronger
incentives to deregulate ts the wage moderation and labor market exibility implemented by
the 1982 Wassenaar agreement in the Netherlands, which at the time was a small portion of a
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completely integrated German economic area, while Germanys labor policy was deregulated
only in the mid-2000s, when not only EMU but also EU enlargement made the country
small and capital-intensive enough to choose labor market exibility. Because the nancial
integration implied by EMU can be timed and bounded more precisely than other events,
however, it o¤ers a real-life counterpart to the exogenous removal of barriers to international
capital mobility that, in the model, endogenously triggers both capital ows and labor market
reforms. To the extent that "downhill" capital ows contributed to external imbalances
within EMU (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002) as labor policies remained country-specic,
the model explains the positive correlation between capital outows and policy deregulation
across countries in Figure 1.
It is interesting to compare that pattern to those observed in other country groups or
periods. Over the early EMU period, Figure 5 shows that the correlation of current account
imbalances and labor market reforms is weak across the EU member countries that did not
adopt the euro. It does become signicantly positive when the comparison period extends to
2007, by which time EU enlargement plausibly implied broader forces of the type experienced
by EMU members in the early 2000s.
Figure 5
The models insights are also applicable to the period after a crisis which to a large
extent severed the international nancial linkages introduced by EMU. If capital stops owing
across borders, the model predicts a reversal of the reforms pattern displayed in Figure 1.
In Figure 6, the LABREF cumulative reform indicator indeed shows Portugal, Greece, and
Spain moving towards labor market exibility after 2009, and core countries moving in the
opposite direction (Germanys introduction of a minimum wage in 2015, not yet tallied in
these data, also ts the predicted pattern).
Figure 6
The patterns shown in Figures 1, 5, and 6 are all very similar if cumulated current accounts
are normalized by initial rather than cumulated GDP, by GNP, or by population (except that
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Luxembourgs current account is even more positive on a per capita basis than as a share of
GDP or GNP). The LABREF count of reform used in those gures is only available for EU
countries, assigns the same weight to more or less drastic changes of di¤erent policies, and
cannot speak to whether the countries that deregulate the most are those that were initially
more regulated, as would be the case if they face stronger "race-to-the-bottom" pressure
(though it would be hard to explain on this basis why some countries tighten labor market
regulation) or informal coordination mechanisms induce convergence to some uniform level
of labor market regulation.8 To address these limitations it is possible to inspect for OECD
countries rough quantitative indicators of the policies that, as discussed in Section 2.2, may
implement the models labor wedge !.
Figures 7 and 8 inspect labor tax rates, which correspond to !s deviation from unity in
the model, and unemployment insurance replacement rates and social expenditures income
share, both of which may proxy the non-employment subsidies that in the model let a low !
result in higher worker welfare. These data are of course approximative, available for most
non-EU member countries of the OECD but not for all EU countries, and only since 2000
(just for odd-numbered years in the case of UI replacement rates).
The top-left panel of Figure 7 shows a negative and signicant relationship between
changes of labor tax wedges and current account surpluses across EMU countries. Like
Figure 1s evidence, and like the less signicant relationship shown in the center panel for
unemployment insurance replacement rates, this is consistent with theoretical incentives for
stronger deregulation in the capital-abundant countries that experience capital outows. If
changes of social expenditures as a percent of national income are a proxy for regulatory
reforms, their correlation with current accounts in the right-hand panel also conforms to the
models predictions.9 The corresponding panels in the bottom row of Figure 7 show insignif-
icant relationships across other OECD countries, hence the models theoretical mechanism
8The EU Treaties do envision "measures aimed at cooperation, knowledge sharing, and exchanges of infor-
mation and best practices" for labor and social policy. However, this is only weakly implemented by requiring
member states to report on jointly set, veriable, regularly updated targets (Van Rie and Marx, 2012).
9There is instead no relationship between international imbalances and changes of empirical indicators of
employment protection, which inuences production and redistributes welfare but, unlike the policies discussed
in Section 2.2, cannot be represented in terms of a simple labor wedge.
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does appear particularly relevant in early EMU experience.
Figure 7
Quantitative indicators characterize each countrys initial policy conguration, so make
it possible to assess the extent to which reforms might be explained by simple convergence
rather than by the relative capital intensity revealed by current account developments. In
Figure 8, initial levels of each indicator are plotted against their changes over the early
EMU period. Evidence of the negative relationships that would be implied by convergence is
weak across EMU countries, and actually stronger across non-EMU countries. Public social
expenditure as a share of income does converge very strongly in both samples, but this may
reects demographic and other structural trends, or mean-reverting cyclical dynamics that,
appearing very similar within and outside EMU, o¤er little empirical support to interactions
between labor and monetary policies rather than capital ows.
Figure 8
In summary, quantitative policy indicators broadly conrm the positive correlation be-
tween deregulation and capital outows implied by the models politico-economic mechanism,
and o¤er much less convincing support for a simpler convergence-based interpretation of EMU
reform patterns.
5 Integrations inequality implications
In the model, international economic integration inuences not only distribution-motivated
labor market policies, but also the distribution of welfare and inequality across and within
countries.
Figure 9 shows that, for the numerical example in the bottom row of Figure 3, the lower-
case peripheral country enjoys strong GDP growth and increases its labor markets regulation,
while the GDP implications of integration are very negative and only partly o¤set by labor
market deregulation in the deregulating upper-case core country. This is similar to Germanys
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experience in EMU, where it "was the largest capital exporter and plunged into a deep slump.
Only one-third of its savings was invested at home, the rest being exported. As a result,
during the early years of the euro the country had the lowest net investment rate and the
lowest growth rate in Europe. Rapidly rising unemployment forced the Schröder government
in 2003 to enact painful social reforms" (Hans-Werner Sinn, Financial Times, July 22, 2013).
The facts are perfectly consistent with this papers model, which however explains them in a
way that may call for a somewhat di¤erent rhetoric.
Before concluding that economic integration damages some countries and benets others,
in fact, one should recognize that welfare depends more on GNP than on GDP. The top-centre
panel of Figure 9 shows that GNP grows in both countries, because the same capital outows
that depress GDP in capital-abundant countries make it possible for their capital to earn
better returns abroad than it would in autarky. Moreover, if labor supply is endogenous one
should also account for the contribution of non-market activities to welfare, measured in the
model by expression (2). Its total and average level in each country should generally increase,
for two reasons: rst, market integration of economies with di¤erent factor ratios is welfare-
improving for individuals who earn factor incomes in the same proportion as their countries;
second, the area-wide labor market deregulation implied by policy competition increases those
individualswelfare, which is maximal at ! = 
 = 1. For the parameterization of Figure 9,
the top-right panel shows that integration and reforms end up increasing average welfare by
just about the same percentage in the two countries.
Next, it should be noted that sums or averages do not measure country-level welfare when
it cannot be transferred across individuals, and that the average change of (2) need not be
experienced by any of the models heterogeneous individuals. To illustrate the models impli-
cations for income and welfare inequality within each of the countries being integrated, the
bottom row of panels in Figure 9 displays some relevant indicators for a simple parameter-
ization of within-country heterogeneity. All individuals own one unit of labor but unequal
amounts of capital, so that capital income is realistically more unequal than labor income.
Fractions  > 0:5 and  > 0:5 of the population own k and K units of capital, for  < 1
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and  < 1, and the rest own (1  ) k= (1  ) and (1 K)K= (1 ) units of capital.
So, in each country poor individuals earn a larger proportion of their income from labor, are
more numerous than rich ones, and are allowed to democratically choose their countrys labor
policy.
Figure 9
For the parameterized example, the bottom-left panel of Figure 9 shows in terms of
high/low income ratios that, because economic integration benets owners of factors that in
autarky were relatively abundant, income inequality increases in the core country, where rich
individuals can take advantage of better unit incomes and the wage implications of capital
outows disproportionately reduce the income of poor individuals. Inequality declines for
symmetric reasons in the peripheral country, and in both countries the much smaller capital
intensity and employment e¤ects of reforms partly o¤set those of capital ows. The center
and right panels of the gures bottom row shows that integration decreases the welfare of
rich individuals in the peripheral country and of poor individuals in the core country, and
that reforms have further and milder welfare implications: because they increase employ-
ment, decrease capital intensity, and increase unit capital incomes at the area-wide level,
integration-induced labor policy changes damage individuals who are capital-poor relative to
the integrated economy. Some such individuals may of course exist in all countries. In the
numerical example, however, reforms as such are not painful for anybody in the core country,
because even its capital-poor residents are capital-rich relative to the integrated area.
Capital reallocation has qualitatively similar income inequality implications if capital is
distributed across more than two classes of individuals, as long as labor income is less unequal
than capital income: capital income convergence implies a positive relationship between
capital outows and within-country inequality changes. In theory, both are endogenous
consequences of nancial integration. Empirically, Figure 10 shows that across EMU countries
cumulated current accounts were indeed positively and signicantly related to changes of the
Gini coe¢ cient of disposable income inequality.10
10The pattern is very similar in terms of income quintile ratios. The same change of measurement methods
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Figure 10
Labor policy reforms are another endogenous consequence of nancial integration. Their
impact on measured inequality is not as clear-cut as that of changes of capital intensity. In
the model outlined above, the labor share of market income is constant and proportional per-
sonal income inequality does not depend on the wedge !, which inuences welfare through
changes of employment as well as of unit factor incomes. In reality, the post-tax-and-transfer
indicators shown in the gures may be directly inuenced by reforms of policies that smooth
idiosyncratic risk (Bertola, 2014), and income inequality is also inuenced by earnings dis-
persion, which economic integration may a¤ect through trade of di¤erently skillintensive
goods. As shown in Figure 11, however, EMU labor market reforms do not appear to explain
the portion of inequality changes that is not explained by international imbalances. Absence
of a systematic relationship does not deny that specic reforms may matter, and Germanys
strong deregulation does appear to have contributed to increasing inequality, especially be-
tween 2005 and 2007.
Figure 11
6 Concluding comments
The models politico-economic mechanism explains both capital ows and reforms as endoge-
nous consequences of integration, but cannot explain integration itself as a policy choice.
While the implications for labor policy of international economic integration might be one
reason for technocrats and wealthy individuals to view the single currency more favorably
than the general population, the locally capital-poor individuals who choose labor policies
are damaged by capital outows in capital-abundant "core" countries, and should oppose
integration. They may not be in a position to inuence their countrys international policy,
or may favor integration for reasons not included in the models welfare function. To make
integration politically acceptable the model could be extended to account for various eco-
nomic reasons why it can be generally benecial, such as the price transparency a¤orded by
was implemented in all countries between 1999 and 2005 (see Bertola 2010a).
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a common currency, or gains from intra-industry trade and economies of scale. There can
also be excellent non-economic reasons for democratic acceptance of economic integration.
In core countries, the decisive individuals welfare may decrease because of capital outows
and deregulation less than it increases if German reunication and prospective peace are
tied to adoption of a single currency. Just because integration is driven also by such political
objectives, in fact, the EMU evidence that motivates and supports this papers analysis o¤ers
a rare opportunity to observe the implications of nancial integration in a situation where
other economic factors play a relatively small role and labor policies remained independent
across countries.
This papers approach and results are positive, not normative, and certainly do not sup-
port a view that all EMU countries should follow the example of the virtuous, exible, and
competitive core, or that the periphery should be blamed for negative imbalances resulting
from an overpaid, misallocated, and lazy workforce. In EMU, some countries did export more
than they imported, and their competitiveness was boosted by wage moderation and labor
market exibility. If nancial integration triggers both capital ows and reforms, however,
current account decits are just as natural for capital-poor countries as uncoordinated labor
market deregulation is for capital-rich countries. Deviations from the models predicted pat-
tern may deserve attention in further work. France, Italy, and Germany (all large countries
with capital intensities similar to the EMU average) followed interestingly di¤erent labor
policy trajectories: the LABREF summary indicator shows Italy tightening labor market
regulation in the early EMU period and relaxing it after the crisis, while France displays a
reform propensity that (like the countrys external balances) is similar to Germanys in both
periods but is not accompanied by increasing inequality. Such policy and outcome trajec-
tories were presumably driven by shifts in political sentiment, policy details, or structural
changes. They cannot be explained by this papers theoretical perspective, which instead
does suggest a possible reason why core governments may insist that crisis countries should
deregulate their labor markets: the political representatives of a capital abundant country
would like labor markets to be deregulated not only in their own country, but in all of the
23
integrated economic area.
The model and the evidence do suggest that labor policy coordination should be more
prominent in the design of Europes policy framework. In EMU, there are binding suprana-
tional constraints on competition and state aid regulation but distribution-motivated labor
and social policies, always di¢ cult to discuss and often impossible to agree upon, are chosen
at the same National level of most political interactions. Yet, in crisis countries they have
been strongly inuenced by supranational institutions as a condition of nancial assistance.
It remains to be seen whether the current situation will evolve towards a reversal of previous
European economic integration trends, or towards policy coordination.
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1998-2005: r=0.61 (0.03); -2006: r=0.70 (0.01); -2007: r=0.53 (0.08).
Figure 1. International imbalances and labor market reforms in early EMU.
Rank correlation statistics and the p-value at which they reject the null of independence
are reported at the bottom. Data denitions (sources): Cumulative Current Account bal-
ance/cumulative GDP (DG EcFin AMECO database); count of measures labeled "Decreas-
ing" net of measures labeled "Increasing" adopted in the period for the domains listed in
footnote 1 (DG EcFin LABREF database).
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Figure 2. Labor policy and market employment.
The downward sloping line plots a (1  ) (k) (al) , the upward sloping line plots b (l) .
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Figure 3. Implications of integration for policy reforms, capital intensity, and employment.
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Figure 4. Labor market reforms and capital mobility triggered by integration among
heterogeneous countries.
Dots refer to 27 countries featuring all combinations of low, mid-range, and high values of
capital (k), size (n), and productivity (a) parameters. Lines join points with the same values
of parameters other than the one on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 5. International imbalances and labor market reforms in non-EMU members of
the EU.
Denitions and sources as in Figure 1.
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Figure 6. Current accounts and reforms before and after the crisis in EMU.
Denition and source as in Figure 1.
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Figure 7. Current accounts and labor policy indicators in and out of EMU.
Cumulative current accounts as percent of cumulated GDP until 2007 (Source: AMECO data-
base), starting from the rst year when the labor market policy indicators of which changes
are displayed are available (Source: OECD; Denitions: total tax wedge including employer
payroll taxes as % of labor costs, single person at 67% of average earnings; public social
expenditure as % of NNI; summary measure of gross unemployment benets entitlements).
Linear regressions with 95% condence interval and rank correlation (p-value of zero null
hypothesis) are displayed in and below each panel.
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Figure 8. Labor policy convergence in and out of EMU.
Initial level and change until 2007 starting from the rst year when the labor market policy
indicators are available.Source and denitions as in Figure7. Linear regressions with 95%
condence interval and rank correlation (p-value of zero null hypothesis) displayed in and
below each panel.
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Figure 9. Inequality implications of nancial integration.
Countries are parameterized as in the bottom row of Figure 3. Within each country, capital
is unevenly distributed across two types of individuals, with the functional forms discussed
in the main text and the parameters shown above the bottom row of diagrams.
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1998-2005: r=0.42 (0.18); -2006: r=0.76 (0.00); -2007: r=0.62 (0.03).
Figure 10. International imbalances and inequality developments in early EMU.
Denitions (source): Cumulation of current accounts as a ratio of cumulated GDP (AMECO
database); change of the Gini coe¢ cient for equivalized household income (Eurostat) Rank
correlation statistics (p-value of zero null hypothesis) are displayed below the gure.
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Figure 11. Inequality, reforms, and current accounts in EMU.
Partial correlations of inequality changes with labor market deregulation (t-statistic 0.27)
and cumulative current accounts (t-statistic 1.55). Denitions and sources as in Figures 1
and 10.
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